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Norwood Russell Hanson not only is widely regarded as one of the leading figures responsible 
for the downfall of logical positivism, but is easily identifiable as one of the earlier practitioners 
of integrated history and philosophy of science. My interest here, though, is neither in 
hagiography nor in the history of the philosophy of science. Rather it is in the discovery of the 
positron in the early 1930’s, a topic on which Hanson had much to say. His principal thesis was 
that this discovery was anything but a “ ‘single line’ disclosure of facts, reminiscent of the 
naturalist finding a new bug beneath a rock.” Rather boldly, he claimed that the discovery of 
the positron was indeed a discovery of three distinct particles: Anderson’s experimental 
discovery, Dirac’stheoretical discovery, and Blackett and Occhialini’s meta-physical discovery. 
As exaggerated as it may seem, Hanson’s thesis contains an important truth, although not 
perhaps quite for reasons he would recognize.  
 
My point of departure is the similarity in the way speak, on the one hand, about discarded 
hypotheticals entities in the history of science (celestial spheres, vital pneuma, Cartesian 
vortices, phlogiston, caloric, ether), and, on the other, about creatures of myth and fiction. 
Although we do not hold that the entities from either category exist, nonetheless we predicate 
various properties of them and hold some predications to be true or on target and others to be 
false or complete misses. For example, that caloric is conserved, that Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective is on target; that caloric is electrically charged, that Holmes is a married man off 
target. Moreover, in both cases we systematically distinguish between what I call conformal 
properties from normal properties. Being conserved, being a detective are conformal 
properties of caloric and Holmes, respectively, conformal in the sense that they are exemplified 
by their subjects according to the theory or according to the story. In other words the truth 
makers for conformal predication is what is said in the context in which they originate. In 
contrast, the truth makers for normal predication are various historical contingencies involving 
the way the world is. Take, for example, being listed as an element in Lavoisier’s table of 
elements, or being more famous than any real live detective. Another mark distinguishing 
properties held normally from those held conformally is that both caloric and Holmes are 
complete with respect to their normal properties but incomplete with respect to their 
conformal. Neither is it the case that caloric is a good neutrino absorber nor is it not the case — 
the caloric theory is simply silent here. Similarly neither is it the case that Holmes has a mole 
next to his navel nor is it not the case. Finally, conformal properties are held necessarily. Caloric 
would not be caloric unless it were conserved, nor Holmes Holmes were he not a detective. 
Normal properties are by and large contingent properties.  
 
Discarded hypotheticals and creatures of myth and fiction in their characteristic features 2 are 
instances of the more general category of objects of supposition. In- cluded in this category 
aremathematical entities as well as idealizations and other useful fictions in science. The 
question is whether all hypothetical entities, not just the discarded ones, fall in this category. 
This would entail that a hypothetical en- tity could never be literally discovered. For if it is 
merely an object of supposition, discourse about it referentially tracks back only to what is said 
and does not refer to some concrete empirical entity. This is the point of departure for my 
deeper examination of the case of the positron. As it turns out, Dirac’s anti-electron is a mere 
object of supposition. Anderson’s positive electron is a concrete empirical entity. Blackett and 
Occhialini create a forged identity between the two, or so I shall argue.  
 
If hypothetical entities are uniformly mere objects of supposition, then the literal view of 
theories, at least for theories that trade in hypotheticals, is simply wrong. Such theories are not 
even candidates for being true or false. Nonetheless they can be evaluated with regard to 
whether or not they are ultimately vindicated , whether in the course of ongoing research an 
identity is forged between the theory’s hypotheticals and subsequently discovered empirical 
entities. 
 
